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Abstract
Microgrids are emerging as an important strategy to
advance resiliency of modern electric power systems. In
this paper, a robust decentralized secondary frequency
control design for islanded microgrids is developed
to enable resilient coordination and integration of
distributed energy resources (DERs). We cast the
control problem centrally under steady state and
adopt the feedback-based Alternating Direction Method
of Multipliers (ADMM) algorithm for solving the
decentralized control updates. The ADMM algorithm
uses measurements at various points in the system to
solve for control signals. Measurements and control
commands are sent over communication networks
such as Ethernet-based local area networks in the
IEC 61850 standard. To enhance the robustness to
cyber intrusions, we modify the ADMM algorithm
using the Round-Robin technique to detect malicious
DERs. As a complementary defense, an agreement
algorithm based on a fast computation of Kirchhoff law
conditions is implemented for continuously detecting
false measurements. The results are demonstrated
through simulation for a representative microgrid
topology.
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authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the
United States Government or any agency thereof.
1. Introduction
Grid modernization envisions the adoption of
information and communication technologies in
the electrical power system for measurement, state
estimation, and control [1]. This enables the increasing
penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs)
in microgrids (MGs), defined as a collection of
controllable loads, DERs, and controls to maintain
stability and serve loads. MGs provide a framework for
DER integration, optimization of local power systems,
ability to serve critical loads, and the intelligence to
recover after outages [2].
When connected to the AEPS, frequency regulation
is provided by rotational inertia from legacy generation
in the AEPS. In island mode, frequency regulation is
a challenge because many DERs inherently have no
rotational inertia. Thus, maintaining MG stability is the
critical concern when inertia-less DERs, such as solar
photovoltaic (PV) and a variety of battery and storage
systems, are integrated in a network. Additionally,
coupling DERs to the grid involves fast-acting power
electronics inverters, requiring sophisticated embedded
controllers for each resource [3]. Accordingly, accurate
measurements at high sampling rates as well as control
commands must be reliably delivered and trusted. To
this end, the hierarchical control of DERs has recently
been adopted as a standard operational paradigm for
islanded MGs [4, 5]. The conventional droop control
design, along with the faster inner voltage and current
control loops, is implemented at the primary level.
Such autonomous local droop control design aims
to stabilize the system frequency and voltage under
random disturbances while ensuring proportional power
sharing among DERs that is proportional to the rated
capacity of the DERs [6]. However, this primary control
may lead to steady state mismatches from nominal
frequency. Meanwhile, the secondary control design,
enabled by the communication network, coordinates the
system-wide information regarding the status of DERs
to further minimize the mismatch error from the primary
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level in a centralized fashion [7].
We formulate the secondary frequency control under
steady state as a consensus optimization problem, as
in [8]. To avoid a single point of failure and enhance
DERs’ plug-and-play capability, we propose to solve
this problem in a decentralized fashion by adopting the
Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM)
algorithm [9]. The ADMM is a splitting optimization
technique that has been widely used in a variety
of scientific disciplines such as signal processing,
statistical learning, and more recently, power system
operations [10]. Based on this algorithm, a DER
controller uses local sensor measurements of voltage
and current to perform a simple algorithmic computation
for generating a local estimate. This estimate is
then communicated to a central supervisor, which
computes the average consensus of all estimates and
broadcasts this consensus variable back to each DER
controller. Our implementation differs from that of
most decentralized frequency control designs [7,11–13]
in that we advocate modifying the ADMM updates
originally derived for the steady state objective to
an online feedback-based scheme, incorporating the
instantaneous power measurements. Interestingly, it
turns out that we do not need to explicitly model the
MG power flow as the instantaneous power feedback
signal couples DERs with power system networks.
The proposed control design has been extensively
validated using a realistic MG, and its performance can
be guaranteed in terms of achieving zero frequency
deviation with proportional power sharing among
DERs.
While the cyber infrastructure enables the proposed
decentralized control design, there is growing concern
that it also exposes an attack surface for cyber
adversaries. This is not hypothetical, as evidenced
by recent cyber-induced outages in the Ukraine power
system [14]. Hence, our control framework requires
cyber defenses for controls and DERs against potential
malicious cyber attacks. We consider an adversary
model whereby an adversary can inject syntactically
correct but destabilizing spoofed measurements and
control commands, causing the secondary frequency
control to fail and possibly resulting in an outage. The
utilization of syntactically correct control commands
during an attack to cause power outages has recently
been reported [15], which motivates this work as
addressing realistic attack scenarios.
Our contribution is to develop a collaborative
defense strategy against these attacks by leveraging
the communication capabilities under the IEC 61850
standard [16]. To enhance the robustness to malicious
control command attacks, we employ the Round-Robin
(RR) technique at the central supervisor for generating
the consensus variable based on the ADMM algorithm
[17]. Interestingly, by tracking the evolution of this
RR-based variable, we are able to effectively identify
compromised DER controllers. As for the measurement
attack, we adopt a complementary defense based on an
Agreement Algorithm (AA) to detect and locate false
measurements on which the secondary control is based
[18, 19]. It should be noted that these two approaches
give visibility into where the attack is happening. Thus,
this can not only enable appropriate response with the
correct mitigation, but also can alert an operator to the
specific root cause. Together with the RR and AA
detection algorithms, the central supervisor would be
able to either isolate the malicious communication links
from control updates or trip the malicious DERs off-line.
This provides a multi-pronged approach to resilient
and efficient MG operation in the face of adversarial
conditions. These algorithms are demonstrated through
simulation analysis of several use cases of interest.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 defines the reference MG topology and
communication architecture, as well as attack scenarios.
Section 3 introduces the droop control characteristic
for islanded MGs while formulating the steady state
consensus problem for the secondary control design.
Section 4 develops the decentralized frequency control
design by adopting the ADMM updates with the
instantaneous power measurement feedback approach.
Considering the attack scenarios in Section 2, we derive
detection mechanisms and propose mitigation strategies
in Section 5. Section 6 showcases the numerical results
to validate our analytical claims. Concluding remarks
are presented in Section 7.
2. Microgrid Modeling and
Communication Architecture
In this section, we define a reference MG topology
for this work and build a narrative around the attack
scenarios. We also describe the IEC 61850 standard and
its architecture which facilitates the control architecture
design in Section 3. Additionally, we qualitatively
detail the attack scenarios that the proposed mitigation
strategies attempt to address.
2.1. Reference Microgrid Topology
Fig. 1 shows the reference topology considered in
this paper. The MG is connected to the AEPS via a
substation, with a corresponding POI where islanding
decisions and requests can be executed. In normal
operations the MG will be connected to the AEPS, but
as a strategy for resilience, the MG has the ability to
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Figure 1. Reference microgrid topology for this work.
island from the AEPS in the event of an outage or other
degraded operation, including cyber or physical attacks
as well as widespread outage due to a major storm.
There are a variety of DERs and loads within the
MG. Two DERs and an interruptible load are connected
directly to the MG feeder head. The MG also contains
a critical load and DER that essentially serves as the
backup source dedicated to the critical load. With both
critical load and DER buses, they have the ability to
island themselves from the rest of the MG as a resilient
strategy for the critical load. In effect, DER-1 and the
critical load, with the associated bus, would become a
nested microgrid.
2.2. Communication Architecture: IEC 61850
As communication networks continue to advance
in electric power systems, an industry standard
has emerged for metering, protection, and control
functions. IEC 61850 provides a standard for
configuring Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) for
electrical substation automation systems to be able
to communicate with each other. It has since
found applications in new domains, including MGs,
see e.g., [20]. IEC 61850 defines a number of
protocols for various classes of substation messages.
Among the protocols relevant for our proposed MG
control system are Sampled Values (SV) and Generic
Object Oriented Sub- station Events (GOOSE). Sampled
Values transmit digitized measurements of voltage
and current from a merging unit to an IED. A
merging unit accepts inputs from current transformers
(CTs) and potential transformers (PTs), and produces
digital, time-synchronized outputs communicated to
other nodes via an Ethernet bus, known as the Process
Bus in IEC 61850; see Fig. 2. GOOSE messages
containing status, data, and control commands can
be sent from one IED to another. The reason for
Figure 2. Notional representation of a standard IEC
61850 substation architecture.
introducing this architecture is two-fold. First, this
standard is seeing increased applications in MGs, and as
such, we find it relevant to design practical algorithms
for field implementation. Second, using this standard
provides a realistic attack surface that adversaries search
out. We find it useful to provide specific solutions
for a widely-used standard, especially considering a
recent cyber attack impacting IEC 61850 [15]. Since
we are dealing with MGs and not with bulk power
systems, the number of nodes such as DER and other
components is in the tens to at most low hundreds. Thus,
modern substation communication architectures based
on Ethernet are easily able to meet the transmission
time and bandwidth requirements of the ensuing control
architecture. As detailed soon, we consider malicious
communication and control signal inputs which attempt
to alter the MG operating points. Based on IEC 61850,
such attacks can effectively drive the frequency away
from the nominal, which is of extremely high stability
concerns.
2.3. Attack Scenarios
Emerging MGs include a central MG controller,
denoted in this paper as Microgrid Controller
(MGC), which communicates with individual DER
controllers. Measurements and commands travel over
communication networks, as given by IEC 61850.
This communication structure potentially exposes the
system to cyber attack, which can assume the form
of invalid commands (which can cause a DER to
perform potentially destabilizing power injections) as
well as falsified measurements (which can lead even a
correctly functioning MGC to issue erroneous control
commands).
2.3.1. Communication Link Attack on Control
Command
The scenario is a communication link attack on the
control command (not measurements) from the MGC
which is used to exchange ADMM-related variables
via the Ethernet-based IEC 61850 station bus. The
attack would result in the MGC calculating the wrong
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consensus variable, which would thus send the MG
to a calculated off-nominal frequency setpoint. The
attack detection mechanism examines the consensus
variable and monitors for any rapid changes that exceed
a threshold. If one is found, the mechanism looks for the
errant local variable and sets the corresponding DER to
local droop control. The remaining DERs participate in
the secondary frequency control while the spoofed DER
operates in local droop mode only.
2.3.2. Local Attack on DER Control Command
The second scenario considers a local control
command attack. An attacker compromises the DER
controller by some mechanism. The attacker can then
cause the system frequency and consensus variable to
deviate from the appropriate references. This attack
detection again relies on monitoring the consensus
variable. Therefore, when it detects which DER is
malicious, it again sets the malicious DER to local
control mode since it is not yet known if it is a
communication link or local controller attack at this
point. By setting the malicious DER to local droop
mode, if the system frequency and consensus variable
are not converging to reference setpoints after a short
time period, the MGC then determines such attack must
be a local DER controller attack and issues a trip signal
to the relay connecting the DER unit to the MG.
2.3.3. Local Measurement Attack
For the last attack scenario, we assume that the
attacker has access either locally to the merging unit (the
sensor), or can have access to the Ethernet-based process
bus and is thus able to inject false measurement data.
The DER controller that subscribes to the measurement
messages would thus calculate incorrect power injection
commands due to the faulty measurements. This
could drive the MG to an unstable state. We assume
that the attack is large enough to cause a reasonable
frequency disturbance within the MG. Accordingly, a
local merging unit attack may result in the tripping of
the DER while a communication link attack on data
measurements leads to reconfigure the control algorithm
and exclude the malicious DERs by setting them to
the local droop mode. We next present the secondary
frequency control problem statement with the proposed
ADMM-based solver and Round-Robin-based detection
mechanism.
3. System Modeling and Problem
Statement
The islanded MG consists of m buses, where the
buses in N := {1, · · ·n} are DER buses and the rest
are in the subset of load buses NL := {n + 1, · · ·m}.
Per bus-i, we represent the complex voltage and its
phase angle as vi and θi, respectively. The active
power injection of DER-i is denoted by Pi while P ∗i
corresponds to its active power rating. Additionally,
ωi := (θ˙i − ωb) is the frequency deviation with
θ˙i := dθi/dt and ωb representing the frequency and
nominal frequency set-point, respectively. To facilitate
the ensuing control design, we introduce the following
assumptions that are commonly used in the microgrid
literature [8, 21, 22].
(A1) The power lines are relatively short and thus
lossless.
(A2) The voltage magnitude |vi| at each bus is regulated
to stay constant.
(A3) All possible load variations can be fully supported
by the DERs without violating their active power
rating limits.
(A4) The load stays constant and is independent of
frequency while executing the proposed frequency
control.
The short distance property in (A1) typically holds for
power lines in MGs. Hence, line losses are negligible
compared to line flows. Through the fast inner control
loops along with the voltage-droop control design,
DERs’ reactive power output is used to track a reference
voltage level, at a much faster time-scale than that of the
frequency control. This time-scale separation between
frequency and voltage dynamics is well supported by
earlier work on MG modeling [23]. Accordingly, this
leads to (A2) where the voltage magnitude at all nodes
can be assumed to be fixed (see, e.g., [4, 21, 22]).
Additionally, (A3) can be guaranteed through a careful
system planning at the MG deployment stage; see e.g.,
[24, Remark 1]. Last, under a load disturbance, the
proposed frequency control design is fast enough to
restore the system frequency to its nominal value before
another load change occurs. Additionally, the frequency
independent load assumption in (A4) is needed for
developing and analyzing the proposed control design.
It is true that there could exist different types of loads
in MGs, such as the prior work in [22, 25] which has
considered frequency dependent loads. Motivated by
[25], it is potentially feasible to generalize the proposed
control design to include frequency dependent loads.
This direction will be pursued in future work.
The goal of a secondary frequency control is to 1)
ensure a steady state zero frequency deviation (i.e., ωi =
0,∀i) and 2) guarantee autonomous active power sharing
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Figure 3. Frequency droop characteristics with
proposed secondary control design.
in proportion to active power ratings among all DERs
such that
P1
P ∗1
=
P2
P ∗2
= · · · Pn
P ∗n
.
To this end, the active power-frequency (P -ω) droop
control is adopted to achieve these objectives [26]. Fig.
3 depicts the droop characteristics which mimics the
dynamical swing equation of a synchronous generator
with zero machine inertia, as given by
Diωi = P
∗
i − Pi − pi (1)
where the droop coefficient Di is determined by the
rating of DER-i. Herein we set a uniformDi/P ∗i among
all DERs. Compared to conventional P -ω droop control,
an additional control input pi is introduced in (1). Since
P ∗i and Di are fixed parameters, the operating set-point
of DER-i can only be changed by judiciously controlling
pi. Under (A2), the model (1) holds because of the
decoupled dynamics between frequency and voltage
control. Accordingly, the frequency will be controlled
by adjusting the active power only assuming voltage
magnitudes stay constant [4, 21, 22].
Upon concatenating all scalar variables into vector
form, we formulate the secondary control problem as a
consensus optimization problem, as given by
min
p
‖P∗ −P− p‖2D−1
subject to
pi
Di
=
pj
Dj
, ∀i, j ∈ N
(2)
where D := diag(D1, ...Dn) is an n×n diagonal matrix
and the weighted norm ‖v‖2D := vTDv for any vector
v. Under steady state and (A3), the objective of (2) turns
out to be zero, corresponding to achieving a zero system
frequency deviation. In addition, due to a uniform
Di/P
∗
i , the equality constraints in (2) equivalently
enforce a proportional active power sharing. Note
that the quadratic program (2) could be solved using
off-the-shelf convex solvers. Nonetheless, the challenge
lies in that the active power injection P is dynamical
and coupled to the power system network. To tackle
this problem, we adopt the feedback approach from
[8] to account for system dynamics. We refer the
reader therein for detailed derivations. To sum up,
under (A1)-(A4), the optimizer of (2) can effectively
archive the aforementioned goal of secondary frequency
regulation.
4. ADMM-based Decentralized Solver
This section introduces our proposed ADMM-based
decentralized secondary control design. The dynamics
coupling P and p are neglected initially. As detailed
below, the feedback approach will be introduced to
account for such interactions. Hence, the objective in (2)
is fully separable. Using the IEC 61850 communication
protocol for measurement and control messages, we can
solve the consensus optimization problem (2) in a fully
decentralized fashion. For notational convenience, we
let the optimization variable xi := pi/Di and the input
variable ci := (P ∗i − Pi)/Di where Pi is the active
power injection from DER-i and locally measurable.
Accordingly, (2) can be reformulated as
minimize
x,z
1
2
‖c− x‖2D (3a)
subject to x = z1 (3b)
where z is a consensus value among the DERs. Note
that the equality constraints in (2) are equivalent
to (3b) under a connected communication network.
Defining the multipliers λ and a constant ρ > 0, we
introduce the augmented Lagrangian function as L =∑
∀i∈N Li(xi, z, λi) where
Li(xi, z, λi) = Di
2
(ci − xi)2 + λi(xi − z) + ρ
2
(xi − z)2.
(4)
Based on the (4), the ADMM algorithm is invoked and
its (k+ 1)-st iteration for DER-i has the following three
steps [9]:
(S1) Update x: As L totally decouples into Li for each
DER-i, minimizing xi involves only the variables
zk and λki . Thus, upon receiving z
k from the
MGC, the update is
xk+1i := arg min
xi
Li(xi, zk, λki ). (5)
Taking the gradient of Li with respect to xi and
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setting it to zero, we have
xk+1i =
ρzk +Dic
k
i − λki
Di + ρ
(6)
where cki is the feedback measurement signal,
corresponding to the active power injection of
DER-i.
(S2) Update z: Likewise, the consensus variable is
updated as
zk+1 := arg min
z
L(xk+1, z,λk).
By initializing λ0 = 0, the summation∑
i∈N λ
k+1
i is guaranteed to stay zero. Thus, we
have
zk+1 =
∑n
i=1 x
k+1
i
|N | . (7)
(S3) Update λ: Each multiplier is linearly updated by
the iterative mismatch of the constraint (3b), as
given by
λk+1i = λ
k
i + ρ(x
k+1
i − zk+1). (8)
Because λ0 = 0, we have
∑
i∈N
λk+1i = ρ
∑
i∈N
k+1∑
t=1
(xti − zt) = 0.
This fact corroborates the derivation in (7).
5. Detection and Localization Strategies
Under IEC 61850 communication network, we
assume that attackers have compromised the local DER
controllers such that the local variable x is altered, e.g.,
x¯k+1i = x
k+1
i +δ
k+1
i where δ
k+1
i is the bias appended to
xk+1i at the DER-i. Therefore, z
k+1 in (7) at the MGC
becomes
zk+1 =
∑n
i=1(x
k+1
i + δ
k+1
i )
n
= ∆k+1 +
∑n
i=1 x
k+1
i
n
(9)
with ∆k+1 :=
∑n
i=1 δ
k+1
i
n being the average attack
bias signal with time-varying and arbitrary magnitude.
Under the presence of this attack, the consensus
variable zk+1 would diverge unless ∆k+1 is designed
specifically so the effect on the consensus variable is
trivial. This is, however, unlikely to happen as the
attacker does not have the full system information. In
any case, such an attack bias signal may drive the MG
to unstable conditions and/or damage system equipment,
e.g., causing divergence of zk+1.
It is imperative to detect and localize the malicious
attack signals promptly since the control design is based
on zk+1. To this end, we monitor the evolution of
zk+1 and design a flag to trigger the ensuing detection
algorithm. Assuming the convergence of zk+1 after k?
iterations, we would trigger the detection algorithm once
the following condition has been satisfied:
|zk+1 − zk| > 
where  > 0 is a pre-defined threshold.
5.1. Round-Robin-Based ADMM Detection
Algorithm
The RR-ADMM detection algorithm to discover the
malicious DERs is adapted from [17]. The RR is an
arrangement of selecting the DER in a fixed rational
order, i.e., DER-1, DER-2, . . . , DER-n. For notational
convenience, we denote the consensus variable for the
RR-ADMM at iteration k as z˜k. Given α > 0, the steps
(S1)-(S3) become
xk+1 = (D+ ρI)−1(ρz˜k1+Dck − λk), (10a)
z˜k+1 = α(xk+1
i˜
+ δk+1
i˜
), (10b)
λk+1 = λk + ρ(xk+1 − z˜k+11) (10c)
where I is the identity matrix with i˜ = 1, · · · , n
representing the fixed Round-Robin iteration index. For
a non-malicious DER, we set δk+1
i˜
= 0. Hence, we have
the consensus variable z˜k+1 as
z˜k+1 = αδk+1
i˜
+ α
ρz˜k +Di˜c
k
i˜
− λk
i˜
Di˜ + ρ
. (11)
For k ≥ 1, (11) can be expressed as
z˜k+1 = αδk+1
i˜
+ α
ρz˜k +Di˜c
k
i˜
− ρ∑kt=1(xti˜ − z˜t)
Di˜ + ρ
.
(12)
Let z˜r := {z˜r,1, · · · , z˜r,n} ∈ Rn gather the all the
values of the consensus variable at the r-th round of
the RR-ADMM algorithm. To determine a threshold
to separate malicious DER controllers from the rest of
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Algorithm 1 Detection and Localization Strategies
1: for every iteration k = 0, 1, 2, · · · do
2: for i ∈ N do
3: Compute xk+1i as in (6) and send it to MGC
4: end for
5: MGC computes zk+1 as in (7)
6: if |(zk+1 − zk| > ) ∧ (k > k?) then
7: if r = 1 then
8: MGC computes z˜k+1 as in (10b)
9: Broadcast the value of z˜k+1 to all DERs
10: Determine the index n˜ for the minimum
entry of z˜1
11: end if
12: if (r = 2) ∧ (k ≤ k? + n+ n˜) then
13: MGC computes z˜k+1 as in (10b)
14: Broadcast the value of z˜k+1 to all DERs
15: Identify malicious DER-˜i where
{˜i | z˜1,˜i > z˜2,n˜,∀i˜ ∈ N \ n˜}
16: MGC reconfigures the communication
network, resets λk = 0, and/or trip malicious DERs
off-line
17: end if
18: else
19: Broadcast the value of zk+1 to all DERs
20: end if
21: for i ∈ N do
22: Compute λk+1i as in (8)
23: end for
24: end for
the system, we assume that the bias δk+1
i˜
is sufficiently
large enough. Based on (12), one of the values from
the non-malicious DERs during the r-th round must
be z˜r,n˜ with the index n˜ corresponding to the smallest
element of z˜r. Given this index, the (r + 1)-st round
is carried out for obtaining the value of z˜r+1,n˜ where
n˜ is the same index as round 1, and this serves as the
detection threshold. Hence, any z˜r,˜i > z˜r+1,n˜,∀i˜ ∈
N \ n˜ is identified as the malicious DER in the MG.
For a given initialization time index k?, Algorithm 1
tabulates the detection strategy. As for the localization
strategy to isolate the aforementioned malicious attack
signals, the MGC first reconfigures the communication
network so the malicious DERs no longer participate
the ADMM updates in (S1)-(S3) and thus switch to
only local droop (primary) control mode. Meanwhile,
if zero frequency deviation is achieved, we conclude
the isolation process. Otherwise, the malicious DERs
are tripped off-line because of either measurement or
control signal attack. Last, note that there must be
at least one non-malicious DER in the system for the
RR-ADMM detection scheme to work. Such a scheme
is only for detection purposes. Thus, once the malicious
attacks are localized, the control design is reverted back
to follow the ADMM algorithm in (S1)-(S3).
5.2. Measurement Attack Detection
We now describe a defense against false
measurement injection to complement defenses against
control attacks given above. We adopt the Agreement
Algorithm (AA), which was developed in [18], to
determine and locate malicious measurement attacks on
substation IEDs and controllers. Accordingly, assuming
the loads as constant impedances, the Kirchhoff’s
voltage and current laws along with Ohm’s law are
used to facilitate the development of agreement matrix
A for a particular topology. Albeit we assume loads
as constant impedance, a general assumption in power
flow studies, the method for developing the AA
presented herein remains valid for other load models.
Elements of A corresponding to the currents reflect
the signed topology of the corresponding merging unit
while others corresponding to voltages are reciprocal
complex impedances on the corresponding lines.
Fig. 1 showcases the reference MG topology with
corresponding measurement locations. The polarity of
the complex current fi measured at i-th merging unit is
positive when current flows into the loads and DERs.
By concatenating as x = (f ,v), the physical equation
can be rewritten as
Ax = 0. (13)
Considering that (13) is similar to the error correcting
code formulation from [18], if an attacker falsifies
one of the measurements, we would have a non-zero
corresponding element of the resultant vector, known
as the Syndrome vector. By injecting the malicious
vectors ∆f and ∆v to the measurements, we have x¯ =
(f + ∆f ,v + ∆v). Thus, the Syndrome vector is
s = Ax¯. (14)
By observing the pattern of vector s, we can classify
multiple subsets of potential malicious merging units.
Accordingly, the largest magnitude element of a subset
corresponds to the malicious location. This detection
mechanism is valid for a limited number of attacks. We
refer the reader to [19] for a detailed discussion.
6. Numerical Tests
In this section, we evaluate the proposed mitigation
strategies and responses for the communication and
measurement link attack scenarios. The three-phase MG
topology and power system parameters are given in Fig.
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Figure 4. Reference microgrid communication
architecure and data types.
1. The load is modeled as a constant impedance load,
which is frequency independent. Fig. 4 depicts the MG
control system communication network topology. To
reiterate, the measurements are sent to the local DERs
from a merging unit (which we omit from the figure),
and the DERs and MGC communicate updates for the
ADMM algorithm. This is done over switched Ethernet,
denoted by the Ethernet bus in Fig. 4. All numerical
tests are performed in Mathworks® MATLAB 2013a
and Simulink software.
6.1. Load Perturbations
In this scenario, we increase the system load by
100% at t = 4s. Each DER is rated at P ∗i = 1500
W, ∀i, and we let Di = 5 × 104 W.s.rad−1, ∀i to
satisfy the active power sharing. The ADMM algorithm
is executed every 100 ms with ρ = 1 × 105. The
resulting bus frequencies and active power output are
shown in Fig. 5. Within approximately 1.5 seconds,
the secondary frequency control is able to obtain zero
system frequency deviation from nominal, and the
DERs have correctly achieved equal power sharing.
Accordingly, each DER archives the the steady state
frequency of 60 Hz.
6.2. Local Attack on DER Controller
We generate an attack signal as a time-varying
random number from a uniform (0,3) distribution and
draw a new random value at a time step of 100
ms. We multiply this by the steady state xi value
at the attack location, so that the attack is effectively
a random re-scaling of this value. Given the steady
state conditions, the attack is introduced at t = 4.1s
on the local xi issued to DER-3. The resulting
system response and RR-ADMM attack detection and
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Figure 5. Frequency and active power output response
to a load disturbance.
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Figure 6. Frequency, active power output, and local xi
update responses to a local controller attack in steady
state operation.
mitigation algorithm results are shown in Fig. 6. From
the plot of the local xi update, this particular attack
introduces a signal that is approximately 275% of the
steady state x3 signal. Clearly, the system diverges away
from its steady state while the attack is present. At t =
5.4s with  setting at 10% of the steady state x3 signal,
the RR-ADMM algorithm successfully detects DER-3
as malicious and trips it off-line, i.e., P3 = 0. For t
> 5.5s, the ADMM algorithm changes to only include
DER-1 and DER-2, achieving the nominal frequency of
60 Hz.
Next, we investigate the effectiveness of the
RR-ADMM detection algorithm for an attack during a
load disturbance. While a coincidental simultaneous
occurrence of these two events may seem unlikely, we
are motivated to seek solutions to coordinated attacks,
i.e., the attacker causes a load disruption and alters
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Figure 7. Frequency, active power output, and local xi
update responses to a local controller attack during a
load disturbance.
the local controller updates, as depicted in Fig. 7.
At t = 4s, we introduce a load disturbance of 25%
and then subsequently cause an attack at t = 4.1s on
the xi update to DER-3, similar to the attack scenario
in the steady state case. We see that the random
attack signal is approximately 200% of the transient
x3 signal. The RR-ADMM algorithm is still able to
identify the malicious DER even in the presence of
a load disturbance. After reconfiguring the ADMM
algorithm and tripping DER-3 off-line at t = 5.5s, the
system achieves the nominal frequency of 60 Hz.
6.3. Communication Link Attack on Control
Command
We consider that an attacker has gained access to
the station bus (Ethernet bus) that is exchanging control
commands between the local DER controllers and the
MGC. The attacker is able to spoof the MAC address of
a DER controller and thus can alter control commands
over the link. This is contrasted with the previous
attack since it is not on the local DER controller, and
thus the time-varying attack signal does not directly
affect the power injection command to the DER. The
attack detection monitors the consensus variable and
raises a flag when a deviation occurs that exceeds a
threshold. In our simulation, we again use a 10%
deviation as the threshold. As the consensus variable
is the average across n DERs, an attack bias may not be
large, so that is the motivation for setting a relatively
sensitive . After the flag is raised, the RR-ADMM
is executed to determine which DER is malicious.
The MGC then reconfigures the ADMM update to
only include the non-malicious DERs while issuing a
configuration command to the spoofed DER to revert to
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Figure 8. Frequency, active power output, and local xi
update responses to an communication link attack on a
control command.
local frequency droop control. The spoofed DER should
then eventually return to its initial power setpoint while
the non-malicious ones continue to regulate the system
frequency for achieving 60 Hz. Fig. 8 depicts the results
of this attack scenario. At t = 4.1s, an attack signal is
introduced on the x3 update sent from DER-3 controller
to the MGC. With the same random attack signal,
the MGC then runs the detection mechanism from the
RR-ADMM to find the malicious DER. At t = 5.3s, the
MGC identifies that DER-3 is malicious and removes it
from the ADMM update by setting it to local frequency
control mode. Note that the x3 update is a function of
p3, which is the power injection offset to the droop curve
in Fig. 3. By setting x3 to zero, the corresponding
DER controller equivalently becomes the local droop
control. By reconfiguring the ADMM algorithm, the
DER-1 and DER-2 continue to execute the secondary
frequency control while maintaining power sharing and
achieving the nominal frequency of 60 Hz.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce a decentralized
secondary frequency control that can successfully
achieve frequency regulation in islanded ac microgrids.
This approach is based on formulating the DER droop
characteristic equations as a consensus optimization
problem with a power injection offset command as
the control variable. This quadratic program is
solved with an ADMM-based decentralized algorithm.
To this end, DER controllers locally compute their
power injection offsets and communicate these values
with the central controller, which then calculates
the consensus of all DERs and broadcasts over the
network. This decentralized approach allows for cyber
attack detection mechanisms on local controllers and
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communication link attacks. The proposed detection
algorithm is based on a Round-Robin ADMM algorithm
which sequentially updates the consensus variable as
a function of local controller updates to identify
malicious DERs. We pair this with a so-called
agreement algorithm, a complementary false data
injection detection mechanism. Mitigation strategies
such as isolating attackers from the control algorithm
or tripping a compromised DER off-line entirely are
discussed. Together with these algorithms, we can
implement a cybersecure resilient closed-loop control
architecture. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness
of our decentralized secondary frequency control design
and detection algorithms using three case studies.
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